Data Sources
• Data about member departures in 2012 were gathered from the "Roll Call Casualty List: 112th Congress" (http://www.rollcall.com/politics/casualtylist.html, accessed October 29, 2012).
• Data about incumbents' share of the two-party vote in 2012 and whether the incumbent was reelected were measured with official election returns from each state's Secretary of State.
• To measure the treatment variable, the vote for S. 365 is posted at the House Clerk's website (http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2011/roll690.xml, accessed October 16, 2012).
• DW-NOMINATE data for 2011 were accessed from http://www.voteview.com/HOUSE SORT112.HTM on October 18, 2012. Speaker John Boehner is the only member who voted on S. 365, yet does not have a NOMINATE score, so he is omitted from analysis.
• Federal Election data on July 2011 cash on hand were gathered from http://www.fec.gov/ finance/disclosure/candcmte info.shtml, accessed October 26-28, 2012.
• For past voting behavior of a district: 2010 vote shares in House elections are from official returns published by each state's Secretary of State. Obama's 2008 share of the two-party vote was calculated and prepared by Greg Giroux of CQ Press (report accessed from http://CQPolitics.com on October 26, 2010).
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Additional Analyses
The remainder of this appendix presents several alternative analyses that were suggested as part of the review process. The printed article presents the findings based on the original, preregistered research design because the results from the original plan should always be reported. However, several worthwhile ideas were suggested by a reviewer that are reasonable and reveal insights that were overlooked by the original analysis. There are two outcome variables in this study-incumbents' retention of their seat and incumbents' share of the two-party vote. Each is reanalyzed in some way here. One reviewer suggestion was to reconsider the outcome of whether members retained their seat using the same population and matched sample as was used in the analysis of vote shares. The original analysis of seat retention included members who retired, sought another office, and lost the primary all as means of failing to retain a seat. Retirements, though, are not all strategic, so lumping these in with losses could produce measurement error. Further, when describing the results for the other outcome-incumbents' share of the two-party voteanyone who did not compete in a contested general election was excluded, so inferences were drawn for a different population. By reconsidering seat retention for members who were in a contested general election, both the measurement issue with non-strategic retirements and the desire to draw inferences for the same population are met.
For this reason, Figure A .1 offers similar information to the results presented in Figure 2 of the primary text, but this time seat retention rates are only considered for those who competed in a contested general election. Figure A .1 still shows the percentage of incumbents who retained their seat, contingent on whether they voted yes or no on the debt ceiling bill (S. 365). The left side of the figure presents the percentages for the full population of incumbents in a contested general election, and the right side presents the percentages for the matched sample. The results in this figure contrast somewhat from those presented in the article. When focusing only on those in contested general elections, we see that no voters are slightly more likely to retain their seat than yes voters, which is what was hypothesized; however, the difference in percentages is not statistically significant in either group. So while those voting against the debt ceiling are slightly more successful in this group, which contrasts from being slightly less successful in the larger group considered in the article, in neither case is the effect discernible.
A second reviewer suggestion was to consider that the debt ceiling was a vote of the ends against the middle. That is, ideologically extreme members of Congress were more likely to oppose raising the debt ceiling, potentially finding stronger support from their constituents for doing so. Hence, I proceed to test whether the effect of voting against raising the debt ceiling on the incumbent's share of the two-party vote was more substantial among the strong ideologues from each party.
A simple reanalysis of the matched sample implies that ideologues do, in fact, drive the positive effect that voting against the debt ceiling had on incumbents' vote share. To show this, I simply split each party's members based on whether they are more liberal or conservative than the median ideology in each respective party, and then evaluate the difference in vote share between those voting for and against raising the debt ceiling. For conservative Republicans (those with a NOMINATE score larger than 0.474), the estimated effect of voting against the debt ceiling is a 3.93 percentage point bump in vote share, and this effect is statistically significant (p = 0.0376). There is also a large estimated treatment effect for voting no among liberal Democrats (NOMINATE score less than -0.440), where the estimated effect is a 3.22 percentage point bump, though this effect is not discernible (p = 0.1879). For moderate Republicans and moderate Democrats, there was clearly no effect as those who voted against the debt ceiling actually did slightly worse on average against ideologically similar party members who voted in favor (effects of -0.47 percentage points for Republicans and -0.67 percentage points for Democrats). Therefore, the effect does appear to be driven by those at the end of the ideological spectrum, while moderate members who voted against the debt ceiling did not see an electoral gain.
As another look at how the effect differs based on ideological extremity, Table A .1 shows the results from linear regression models of incumbents' vote shares. These models consider the probit transform of vote shares to account for the fact that vote proportions cannot be less than zero or greater than one. The second and third columns present the estimates and standard errors when the model is fitted over the full population of incumbents in contested elections. Meanwhile, the fourth and fifth columns present the results when the model is fitted over the matched sample. To capture how the effect of a no vote on S. 365 varied based on ideological extremity, the indicator for a no vote is interacted with linear and squared first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. To see what the estimated effect of a vote against the debt ceiling is at various levels of ideology, Figure A .2 visualizes the effects from these regression models. In each panel, the horizontal axis represents the value of a member's first-dimension NOMINATE score, and the vertical axis represents the regression coefficient for a vote agains the debt ceiling at that value. The solid line on each graph reports the estimated coefficient by ideology, and the dashed line presents the lower bound of a one-tailed 90% confidence interval. Whenever the confidence interval is greater than zero, then a no vote had a significant and positive effect on the incumbent's vote share. Both graphs show that members in the ideological middle experienced no real gain from voting against raising the debt ceiling, but members at each ideological extreme on the left and the right experienced larger positive effects from voting against the bill. In Subfigure 2(a), which shows the results for the full data, we only see a discernible positive effect for the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. By contrast, Subfigure 2(b) shows the results from the matched sample, and we see that both extreme liberals and extreme conservatives experienced a significant positive gain from voting against raising the debt ceiling. All together, then, these additional analyses of the data show an intriguing finding that ideological extremists had the most to gain electorally from voting against the debt deal. This paper serves to present in brief a research design by which I will assess how incumbents' votes on the debt ceiling influenced their ability to retain their seats and their share of the two-party vote in the general election. By publicly releasing this research design before the outcome of the 2012 election is observed, I follow the advice of Rubin (2006), who makes the case that the design phase of research should be completed with no reference to the outcome variable. In this way, the design efforts cannot "inappropriately slant estimation of the treatment effects on outcomes" (Rubin 2006: 369 observations that I will include to assess a treatment effect. In sum, the completion of this analysis after the election ought to offer an honest and accurate assessment of the effect of the debt ceiling vote on the 2012 election.
Data and Measurement
In this study, I consider two outcomes of interest. The first is simply whether a member of Congress was able to retain his or her seat through the 2012 elections. In this way, all members who win re-election (whether they faced challengers or not) are considered successful in the end, while all members who do not win re-election (whether they lost in the primary, general election, or retired) have failed. For this outcome, the population of interest is every incumbent member who voted on the debt ceiling. It is possible that how a member voted on this bill shaped late fundraising and the emergence of challengers in a variety of ways that could help or hinder the member's ability to retain his or her seat. Hence, if a congressperson's vote deterred challengers making re-election easier or drew enough opposition to lead the member to retire strategically, this outcome can pick up the effect.
2
Although the dichotomous indicator of whether a candidate retained office offers a global outcome that is of particular interest, the effect of a policy position is likely to have a more subtle effect. For this reason, as a second outcome variable, I also examine how the treatment influence's the incumbent's share of the two-party vote. In this case, the population of interest is narrowed to incumbents who are in a competitive general election in 2012. The treatment effect, then, asks not whether a policy stand like this can help an incumbent win in general, but rather how such a stance might shape the marginal vote share when the incumbent does have to face a general election challenger. Together, then, these two outcomes offer the opportunity to assess both the consequences of this controversial vote for the dynamics of a general election as well as whether incumbents can retain office. 
Measuring the Treatment and Covariates
The treatment variable in this case is simply whether a member of Congress voted against raising the debt ceiling on August 1, 2011, with control units having voted in favor of this measure. The treatment is assumed to have been administered at the time of this vote, at which point the incumbent's recorded position on the issue was formally made public.
As an issue stance, the recipient of the treatment is the electorate, which ultimately chooses whether to give the incumbent another term and in what proportion to vote for the incumbent.
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In modeling the effect of this treatment, it is essential to account for other factors known to explain the vote shares of incumbents. These factors are: incumbent's ideology, district ideology, incumbent's prior vote share, and campaign funding (Abramowitz 2004; Abramowitz and Segal 1992) . With the incumbent's ideology, past research shows that ideologically extreme members of Congress have more difficulty winning re-election.
Therefore, I match members by their score on the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE for 2011. 5 How much campaign money an incumbent has access to was recorded from the cash on hand listed in their July 2011 report to the Federal Election Commission. 
Matching Design
To isolate the treatment effect of a House member's debt ceiling vote on each outcome under consideration, I match treated and control units using coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King and Porro 2012) . In this method, continuous covariates are divided into a discrete number of categories and then an exact matching algorithm is applied to this coarsened data. Among the many desirable properties of this estimator is the fact that it is a Monotonic Imbalance Bounding matching method, which means that for a given level of coarsening, the degree of covariate imbalance between treated and controlled observations cannot exceed a certain level.
First, I generate a matched sample from the 423 valid observations of incumbents who voted on the debt ceiling.
8 Table 4 , in the appendix, provides a full list of the 175 members who are in this matched sample. With the sample from Table 4 , I will assess whether members were able to retain their seat beyond the November 2012 election. Three members did not vote on this bill, two seats were vacant at the time of the vote, one member (Boehner) is omitted due to insufficient data for a NOMINATE score, and six members subsequently resigned office. The resigning members are classified as "involuntary departures" following the distinction made by Cox and Katz (2002) . These members are omitted from analysis as non-electoral forces pushed them out of office.
9 For both outcomes-retaining a seat and share of the two-party vote-I will assess the causal effect by calculating the local sample average treatment effect on the treated (Iacus, King and Porro 2012: 3). With the sample from Table 5, I will assess the impact that the debt ceiling vote had on the incumbent's share of the two-party vote when facing a competitive election. Table 2 shows how the matched sample shows better covariate balance between treatment and control observations than the raw sample. Again, comparing the top of the table to the bottom, we see that the absolute value of the differences in empirical means and percentiles is smaller for the matched sample in nearly every case. Further, for three of the four covariates, L 1 is smaller for the matched sample than the raw data. The only deviations from this trend in the matched sample are a larger first quartile difference for Obama's vote share and a larger value of L 1 for cash on hand in July 2011. On the whole, though, balance seems much improved for individual covariates. Further, the multivariate balance improves noticeably with a drop in L 1 from .822 for the raw data to .772 for the matched sample. The local common support also rises from 12.5% to 14.3%. Overall, then, the matched sample is in a better position to assess the causal effect of the debt ceiling vote on the incumbent's share of the two-party vote for competitive elections.
Observations on Intermediary Outcomes
With these two matched samples in hand, this design is poised to assess the causal effects on the outcomes of interest. It is of note, though, that one population of interest (incumbents being challenged in a general election) is a subset of the other (all members of the 112th Congress). The fact that so many events could happen that might prevent someone from the larger population from entering the second group of those in a competitive election also calls for an understanding of intermediary outcomes. In particular, a member of Congress may be unopposed in the general election, lose in his or her primary, retire, or decide to seek a higher office. Under any of these circumstances, we would not observe the incumbent standing for re-election against an opponent from the opposing party.
To get a sense of what happened between the debt ceiling vote and the upcoming general election, Table 3 presents a multinomial probit model of the various intermediate events that may happen to a member of Congress. In this model, the reference category is for an incumbent to advance to a general election against a challenger. This reference group is compared with the four other alternatives of advancing to a general election without facing a challenger, losing in the primary, retiring, or seeking higher office. For each of the four alternatives listed in the table, a unique set of coefficients is presented illustrating how a covariate influences the probability of the event relative to the baseline of a competitive general election. Each row is a posterior summary, giving the mean, standard deviation, and 95% credible interval from MCMC estimates of the parameter.
A few results stand out in particular. First, there is a robust effect for the incumbent's 2010 vote share in all four equations. Incumbents who performed better in the previous election were less likely to lose their primary, retire, or seek higher office relative to standing in a competitive election. They were more likely, though, to advance to a general election without a competitor from the other major party. Second, more ideologically extreme members are more likely to compete in an uncontested general election than a contested on. This is potentially the consequence of ideologically extreme districts where such voting behavior is rewarded and the opposing party cannot compete. Finally, a vote against the debt ceiling raises the probability of standing in an uncontested election relative to a competitive general election, suggesting that in certain districts distinct issue positions such as this can be electorally beneficial.
Future Plans
The descriptive picture painted by the study of intermediary outcomes implies that members of Congress potentially are able to leverage electoral gain from position-taking on the debt ceiling issue. Therefore, a fuller assessment of the treatment effect this issue has on House members' electoral fortunes is warranted. Having committed to matched samples to assess how this policy vote shaped seat retention and two-party vote shares, this research design offers an honest clear path to estimating the impact of this issue. Notes: The outcome variable is a five-category nominal variable for the eventual outcome for an incumbent member of the House. The reference group is that the member went on to compete in a contested general election. The table presents coefficient estimates for each of the other four possible outcomes relative to the reference of a general election. The model is estimated using the technique developed by Imai and van Dyk (2005) . Estimation was completed using 5000 MCMC draws, posterior summaries are presented. Estimates were computed using the MNP package in R 2.15.1. by their district number for the 112th Congress, rather than their new district for the 2012 election. The treatment variable is whether the incumbent voted against raising the debt ceiling. A coding of 1 under "no" indicates a vote against, while a 0 indicates a vote for raising the debt ceiling. 175 matched observations consist of 74 units with the treatment (a "no" vote) and 101 control units ("yea" votes) Matches were found through coarsened exact matching, applied using the cem package in R 2.15.1. 
Appendix: Complete Lists of Matches for 2012 Study

